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1. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this study is on the “rentier” character of state and economy in relation to
capital accumulation during the period of 1960-1997 in Iran. The rentier character and
structure of the Iranian State reflects the domination of the economy by the oil sector
(Mahdavy 1970, Bina 1992a). The rentier nature of the Iranian economy is also potentially
recognized through a strand of literature in economic development, known as Dutch
Disease (Katouzian 1978, Corden and Neary 1982, Corden 1984, Romer 1985, Evans
1986). Such domination has continually been the common denominator of both the Shah’s,
as well as the Islamic Republic’s regimes in Iran. For the analysis of oil rents theory, see
Bina 1985 (Ch. 5), 1989, 1990, 1992b. It is shown through a simple but decisive
econometric model that oil revenues had a positive and significant relationship with the
long-term trend of gross fixed domestic capital formation (GFDCF) during the latter part of
Shah’s regime in Iran. However, it is also shown that such a positive and significant
relationship had suddenly become negative after the legendary oil price hike of 1973-1974,
despite the fact that it brought an enormous windfall to the Shah’s treasury by 1975 (Bina
1985, 1988, 1990, Karshenas 1990). The situation under the Islamic regime has been
somewhat different. Iran’s oil revenues have declined substantially, and were subject to
much fluctuation during the period of 1980-1997 (Fesharaki 1985, Bina 1992a, EIU,
various issues). It is shown that econometrically there is no significant relationship between
the extent of oil revenues and the gross fixed domestic capital formation (GFDCF) during
the period of 1980-1997 in Iran. Moreover, the Islamic regime in Iran does not appear to
have paid much attention to capital accumulation and long-term investment. Instead, the
government seems to have allocated the revenues from oil rents to politically motivated
consumption expenditures and unproductive activities, presumably, to contain and
ameliorate the potential internal political upheavals and external threats during the period
under study (Mofid 1990, Yaghmaian 1992). The analogue of these activities is the fact that
the Government of the Islamic Republic has consistently engaged in the allocation of
various sorts of (formal and informal) subsidies to those areas and interest groups that
provided sustained ideological and material support for the fortification of the regime in
Iran (see Bina and Zangeneh 1992, Amuzegar 1993, Bina 1994a, 1999, Zangeneh 1997,
1999).

2. THE HYPOTHESES, MODEL, AND DATA
2.1. The Hypotheses
Given the weight of the literature concerning the dominant nature of oil revenues (rents) in
the Iranian economy, the relationship between the level of oil revenues and that of the gross
fixed capital formation is hypothesized as follows for different time periods:
Null Hypothesis I:
There is a significant relationship between the amount of oil revenues and the level of gross
fixed capital formation (GFDCF) in the Iranian economy under the Shah’s regime. There
can be two outcomes, Ia and Ib
Null Hypothesis Ia: There is a positive (upward) shift in the above relationship (i.e., Null
Hypothesis I) since the 1973-oil crisis during the Shah’s regime.
Alternative Hypothesis Ib: There is a negative (downward) shift in the above relationship
(i.e., null hypothesis I) since the 1973-oil crisis during the Shah’s regime.
Alternative Hypothesis I
There is no relationship between the amount of oil revenues and the level of gross fixed
domestic capital formation in the Iranian economy under the Shah’s regime.
Null Hypothesis II: There is a positive relationship between the amount of oil revenues and
the level of gross fixed domestic capital formation (GFDCF) under the Islamic Republic in
Iran.
Alternate Hypothesis II: There is no relationship between the amount of oil revenues and
the level of gross fixed capital formation under the Islamic Republic in Iran.
These relationships are measured through the test of significance of the corresponding
linear models indicated above. This would capture the hypothesized influence of oil
revenues on capital investment during the two sub-periods under study in Iran.
2.2. The Model
The entire period of the study extends from 1960 through 1997, spanning the Shah’s
regime as well as the IslamicRepublic regime in Iran. This period is divided into the two
sub-periods of 1960-1979 and 1980-1997, corresponding with the above respective
regimes. The period under study is limited to the availability of the time series data for the
variables utilized in the model.
The model in its functional form is as follows:
It = ƒ(Rt),
where, correspondingly, Rt and It stand for time series of oil revenue (oil rent) and gross
fixed capital formation, assuming that It is a linear function of Rt.Given the structural

differences between the Shah’s regime and the regime of Islamic Republic, the entire
period of 1960-1997 has been divided into two sub-periods, each of which relates to the
appropriate regime. The models utilized in the estimation of parameters for the two subperiods are as follows:
(1) It = α + βRt + Dt + ε,
(2) I't = α' + β'R't + ε',
where It and I't are designated as dependent variables in time t, and Rt and R't as

independent variables for oil revenues (oil rents) for the two sub-periods; α, α', β, and β'
are vectors of parameters in the equations (α and α' constants, and β and β' coefficients of
independent variable), and ε, and ε' are the residuals, and D is a binary variable (see
Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998a, Kennedy 1998).

2.3. The Data
The time series data on the gross fixed domestic capital formation (GFDCF) for the entire
period of 1960-1997 are obtained from the Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi, Annual
Report, various issues, EIU, various issues, IMF, International Financial Statistics). These
data are nominal and kept in Iranian currency. As a result, one of the shortcomings of the
data is the lack of adjustment for inflation. However, while it would have been desirable to
utilize a real trend for a more accurate year-to-year comparison, due to the lack of
information on the actual inflation rate in Iran, the authors had no choice except to utilize
what was available. The time series data on Iranian oil revenues is in US dollars. Although
problematic in terms of exchange rate, the revenue has been converted to Iranian rials for
both sub-periods. These data are obtained from OPEC (Annual Statistical Bulletin, various
issues). The conversion of the oil revenue data for the sub-period of 1960-1979 has been
made at 760 rials per US dollar. This rate was consistently utilized by the Central Bank
under the Shah (Pesaran 1992, Bina 1994b, EIU, various issues).
However, due to the unprecedented and unusual controls by the Islamic Republic—
particularly the policy of holding multiple exchange rates—the oil revenue data for the
period of 1979-1997 are kept in its original (US dollar) denomination. Despite these
shortcomings, the time series are rather up-to-date and complete relative to what had been
available previously on Iran’s economy (Bank Markazi 1998).

Figure 1 shows the trend of the gross fixed domestic capital formation (GFDCF) for the
period of 1960-1997 in Iran. This trend reflects the growth of the Iranian economy in the
long run, and overlaps the two regimes. While the shape of GFDCF somewhat resembles
an inverted "V" during the 1960-1979 period, it is nearly "N"-shaped during the 1980-1997
period. GFDCF figures include gross capital investment in agriculture, oil and gas, mining
and manufacturing, commercial and residential structures, and services. During the Shah's
regime, in the period under study, GFDCF has increased steadily-except in the mid-1960sthrough mid-1974, and then exhibited its sharpest increase ever in the Iranian economy
during the 1974-1975 period. This period coincides, with a small lag, with the oil crisis of
early 1970s, and the worldwide oil price hike of 1973-1974 (Bina 1985, 1990). However,
GFDCF declines sharply from 1976 through 1979, when the Shah's regime was
overthrown.
The trend of GDFCF during the regime of Islamic Republic is similarly moving with the
trend of Iran's oil revenues. Even though the trend of GFDCF shows a brief decline, the
new regime benefited from a sharp increase in the global oil prices in 1986, and reversed
its direction. As can be seen from Figure 1, GDFCF shows a sharp increase from 19811983 when it levels off first and begins to taper off intensely from 1984 to 1987, a period
of precipitous decline in the oil prices. The period of 1987-1995, however, can be divided
into the two periods of sharp and (subsequent) moderate increase, which levels off
thereafter during the period under study (see Figure 1).
As for the oil revenues in Iran, given the Iranian Revolution (1979), the period under study
has been divided into the two sub-periods of 1960-1979 and 1980-1997. As can be seen
from the comparison of the corresponding trends of oil revenues during the Shah's period,
they are nearly mirror image of each other in both US dollars and Iranian rials (see Figures
2 and 3). This similarity stems from the fact that the Iranian currency has remained stable
vis-à-vis the US dollar during this period. The oil revenues were steadily increasing from
1960 through 1972, before showing a tremendous increase during the oil crisis of 19731974, which has led to fourfold increase of 'posted prices' by OPEC (Alnasrawi 1985, Bina
1985, 1988, 1990). For the remainder of the period, however, oil revenues declined
moderately in 1974-1975, before another increase during the 1976-1977 period, followed
by a sharp decline the final years of the Shah's regime.

The trend of the oil revenues during the reign of the Islamic Republic is completely
different from that of the Shah’s. The oil revenues trend in terms of US dollars, as opposed
to Iranian rials, shows a marked difference. This difference is due to the fact that data on
the oil revenues are primarily collected by OPEC in dollar terms and any conversion to
rials must be made based upon the declining value of the Iranian rial (vis-à-vis the US
dollar) during the period of 1980-1997. However, given the inconsistent exchange-rate
policies by the state since 1993, such a conversion remains problematic. The problem is
compounded by the fact that the government of the Islamic Republic allowed the
conversion according to both the "official" and market-determined rates (Pesaran 1992,
Bina 1990, 1992a, 1994b). Finally, due to severe domestic inflation, any attempt at the
conversion of oil revenues from US dollars to Iranian rials would lead to an enormously
inflated trend, particularly since 1993. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the estimations, an
attempt has been made to utilize both converted and dollar figures; the results are nearly the
same.
As Figure 4 shows, there is an increase in the oil revenues from 1981 through 1983,
following the revolution. However, there is a sharp decline in that trend (in US dollars)
from 1983 to 1986, where the oil revenues reached their lowest level during this sub-

period. The decline of the converted oil revenue trend (in Iranian rials), although more
moderate by comparison, attains its lowest level as well in 1986 (see Figure 5). In terms of
US dollars, oil revenues bottom out from the 1986 through 1990, and level off thereafter
toward the end of the period under study. Yet, the trend of oil revenues since 1993, in terms
of the official devaluation of rial, shows a marked increase from 1986 through 1996, and
thereafter levels off toward the end of the period. The difference between these two trends
is due to the inevitable devaluation of rial, which in turn reflects the existence of domestic
hyperinflation.

It is important to also look at the corresponding trends of GDP and GDP growth during the
1960-1997 period corresponding with the two regimes. Figure 6 shows GDP figures in rial
for the entire period under study. During the 1960-1976 period Iranian GDP shows a
steady growth rate, with a somewhat higher rate in the last two years, having, presumably,
to do with latent effect of the oil price hike. However, from 1976 through the end of the
Shah’s regime in 1979, there is a sharp decline in GDP as well as GFPCF (see Figures 6, 7
and 8). In addition to the unmistakable effect of the revolutionary upheaval at this time,
there is a decline in the oil revenues as well (see Figures 2 and 3). The economy, being at
standstill due to the revolutionary disruption at the beginning of the second sub-period,

then recovers sharply from 1980 through 1982, followed by an equally sharp decline,
hitting the bottom in 1986 (see Figures 6 and 7). The mirror image of this up-and-down,
which is apparent from the trend of GDP growth, can also be seen in the up-and-down of
the oil revenues—in terms of the stable US dollar rather than hyperinflationary Iranian rial
—during the 1980-1986 period (see Figures 4 and 5). From 1986 to 1990 the GDP sharply
increases—during the time when the oil revenues also increase—followed by a moderate
increase thereafter (see Pesaran 1992, Bina 1992a, Amuzegar 1993).

In the meantime, by looking at the trend of gross fixed public capital formation (GFPCF)
for the entire period of 1960-1997, nearly the mirror image of the oil revenue trend comes
to mind (see Figures 2, 4 and 8). This can be seen as a clear indication that Iran’s economy
possesses a rentier character, which, by and large, depends upon the exportation of oil
alone (Bina 1992a, Zangeneh 1997). In the next section, we shall demonstrate this point
more systematically.

Finally, GFDCF trend as the percentage of GDP for the entire period under study is yet
another indicator of the centrality of oil in the Iranian economy. Moreover, this trend
nearly mimics the oil revenue trend for the sub-period of 1960-1980 (see Figures 2 and 9).
The GFDCF trend as the percentage of GDP for the sub-period of 1980-1997, however, is
not as similar as the oil revenue trend in comparison with their counterparts during the subperiod of 1960-1979. Yet, the two trends are somewhat moving in the same direction
perhaps with a year or two lagged periods (see Figures 4 and 11).

3. THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Given the instability of the Iranian rial in terms of the US dollar during the Islamic
Republic (1980-1997), and the desire to measure in similar framework the relationships in
the models, the estimation has been done with oil revenues in both US dollars and Iranian
rials (Pesaran 1992, Bina 1994b). As can be seen from the estimation of Equation Ia and
Equation Ib (Tables 1 & 2), this distinction is not consequential for the Shah’s regime. The
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) method has been employed via Eviews (version 4) in this
study. The estimated coefficient of oil revenues for the sub-period of 1960-1979 is
significant (and positive) at 1% level while the coefficient of constant in the equation
shows no statistical significance.
At the same time, by employing the dummy variable technique in the latter period (See
Table 1), we attempt to find out that whether there has been a significant shift in the
function. In this manner, the period of 1960-1979 has been divided into the two subperiods of 1960-1973 and 1974-1979, corresponding with 0 and 1, measuring the impact of

the oil crisis. The coefficient for Dt is at the 1% significance level. However, the sign is
negative indicating that the quadrupled OPEC oil “posted prices” in 1974, and thus the
effect of substantial increase in the oil revenues had indeed been negative for capital
investment in Iran during the Shah’s regime. In other words, peculiarly enough, increased
oil revenues corresponded with a substantial reduction in the amount of capital formation in
the latter part of the Shah’s regime.
This result may seem somewhat anomalous upon initial inspection. However, this finding
does not appear out of ordinary when it is subjected to a closer examination, particularly by
focusing on the Shah’s monumental military expenditures in the latter part of 1970s. The
above result is also supported by the so-called Dutch Disease literature, associated with
traditional development economics, in which the booming production of a single
commodity (i.e., raw material) would ordinarily lead to deindustrialization of the economy
as a whole (see Katouzian 1978, Corden and Neary 1982, Corden 1984, Romer 1985,
Evans 1986). The goodness of fit of the estimation, measured by R-squared, is 0.93%, with
no serial correlation (see the D.W. statistic in the appropriate table below) in the regression
equation.
Given the suspicion that economic-series often exhibit non-stationary attributes, the
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was conducted on I (GFDCF) and R (OILD, OIL).
OILD stands for oil revenues in U.S. dollars and OIL represents revenues in Iranian rials.
The sample was divided into two sample study periods of 1960-1979 and 1980-1997. For
the first sample period, the respective t-values of the ADF test for I and R were –1.13 and –
2.13; indicating that both series were non-stationary. However, a co-integration test for the
regression equation (i.e., the statistical relationship of I, R, and D) shows that the model is
co-integrated. The t-value of the unit root test for the residual of the regression equation is
–2.47, in conjunction with MacKinnon 5% critical value of –1.96. The unit root test for
the sample period of 1980-1997 showed again that both I and R were non-stationary series
at the 99% significance level. However, our model was co-integrated at the 95%
significance level. The t-value unit root for the regression equation is –2.23, with the
MacKinnon 5% critical value 1.96. Therefore, our unit root test confirms the stationarity of
the model, and validity of our estimated coefficients for both equations associated with
both periods under study (see Greene 2000, Ch. 18).

TABLE 1
Result of Equation Ia: 1960-1979:
Shah’s Era and First Oil Crisis, Oil Revenues in US Dollars

Dependent Variable: I
Method: Least Squares

Sample: 1960-1979
Included observations: 20
Variable

Coefficient Std. Error

t-Statistic Prob.

C

155.9192 99.67088

1.564341 0.1362

OILD

0.265182 0.038575

6.874456 0.0000

D

-3295.808 758.6805 -4.344131 0.0004

R-squared

0.941972

Mean dependent var 1218.280

Adjusted Rsquared

0.935145

S.D. dependent var 985.1633

S.E. of
regression

250.8880 Akaike info criterion 14.02537

Sum squared
resid

1070062.

Schwarz criterion

14.17473

-137.2537

F-statistic

137.9806

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000000

Log likelihood

Durbin-Watson
1.808420
stat

Finally, the regression equation with converted oil revenues into rial would also show the
same result (Table 2). This indicates a statistically significant coefficient (at the 1% level)
for oil revenue, with positive sign as well as similar significance (at the 1% level) for Dt
with a negative sign (see the results for Equation Ia and Equation Ib below). As a result,
we accept null hypothesis I. Moreover, we confirm that there is a significant statistical
relationship between the vector of oil revenues and capital investments during the subperiod of 1960-1979 in Iran. This relationship is positive, as the sign of the coefficient of
oil revenues would indicate (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998a, 1998b, Kennedy 1998).

Finally, we reject null hypothesis Ia and accept alternative hypothesis Ib. This confirms the
fact that there is a significant downward shift in the coefficient of constant, having to do
with the oil windfall of the 1974 in Iran. The result is consistent with Dutch Disease
literature as well, having to do with the negative effect of reliance on a single commodity in
the process of economic development.

TABLE 2
Result of Equation Ib: 1960-1979:
Shah’s Era and First Oil Crisis, Oil Revenues in Iranian Rial

Dependent Variable: I
Method: Least Squares

Sample: 1960-1979
Included observations: 20
Variable

Coefficient Std.
Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

156.5321

99.56148 1.572215

0.1343

OIL

0.348811

0.050715 6.877866

0.0000

D

-3294.588 758.1319 -4.345665 0.0004

R-squared

0.942014

Mean dependent var 1218.280

Adjusted Rsquared

0.935192

S.D. dependent var

S.E. of
regression

250.7966

Akaike info criterion 14.02464

Sum squared
resid

1069281.

Schwarz criterion

985.1633

14.17400

Log likelihood -137.2464 F-statistic

138.0875

Durbin-Watson 1.807775
stat

0.000000

Prob(F-statistic)

The regression equations for the sub-period of 1980-1997 are similarly testing the
relationship of the oil revenue and capitalinvestment trends under the Islamic Republic in
Iran (Table 3 & 4). In Equation IIa, oil revenues are in U.S. dollars while gross fixed
domestic capital formation (GFDCF) is in Iranian rials. For easier interpretation of the
coefficients in Equation IIb, oil revenues are converted to the same unit as the GFDCF,
Iranian rials. Given the instability of foreign exchange, and the existence of parallel
markets in foreign currency in Iran, however, such a conversion is by no means immune
from controversy.
In the estimation of both Equation IIa and Equation IIb, we encountered the problem of
serial correlation. After solving for significant second-order serial correlation associated
with both of these regression equations, we have obtained no significant statistical

relationship between the vector of oil revenues and that of capital investments during the
period of 1980-1997 in Iran. Moreover, the coefficient of oil revenues in both regression
equations is not significantly different from zero. Consequently, we reject null hypothesis
II and accept alternative hypothesis II associated with the sub-period of 1980-1997. In
other words, we confirm that there is no (statistically) significant relationship between oil
revenues and capital investments during the Islamic Republic in Iran. Given the dismal
conditions of the Iranian economy, not only did oil revenues decline, but they also were not
properly allocated to productive investments that were essential for the economic growth
during the period of 1980-1997. Moreover, the Islamic Republic appears to have allocated
the oil revenues toward consumption, thus neutralizing the external threat and, more
importantly, subsidizing the domestic interest groups whose ideological support has been
essential for the preservation of regime in Iran.
Figures 12 (U.S. dollars) and 13 (Iranian rials) plot the goodness of fit for the actual and
predicted trends of GDFCF for the first sub-period 1960-1979. Figures 14 (U.S. dollars)
and 15 (Iranian rials) give the same information for the second sub-period 1980-1997.
Visual examination of the goodness of fit, notwithstanding the above tests, shows us that
the estimated models are valid.

TABLE 3
Result of Equation IIa: 1980-1997:
(Oil Revenues in US Dollars)

Dependent Variable: I
Method: Least Squares

Sample: 1980-1997
Included observations: 18
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations
Variable

Coefficient Std.
Error

t-Statistic

C

2082.350

OILD

-0.003835 0.017673 -0.217001 0.8313

AR(1)

1.143687

AR(2)

-0.468628 0.194958 -2.403731 0.0306

R-squared

0.718400

Mean dependent var

1942.267

Adjusted Rsquared

0.658058

S.D. dependent var

455.2998

S.E. of
regression

266.2404

Akaike info criterion 14.19981

Sum squared
resid

992375.1

Schwarz criterion

319.9946 6.507454

0.197952 5.777587

Prob.

0.0000

0.0000

14.39767

Log likelihood -123.7983 F-statistic

11.90533

Durbin-Watson 1.687197
stat

0.000383

Prob(F-statistic)

TABLE 4

Result of Equation IIb: 1980-1997:
(Oil Revenues in Iranian Rials)
Dependent Variable: I
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1980-1997
Included observations: 18
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations
Variable

Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic

Prob.

C

1859.563

290.9086 6.392259

0.0000

OIL

0.009356

0.014073 0.664837

0.5170

AR(1)

1.032612

0.217171 4.754841

0.0003

AR(2)

-0.398013

0.203277 -1.957982 0.0705

R-squared

0.722656

Mean dependent var

1942.267

Adjusted Rsquared

0.663225

S.D. dependent var

455.2998

S.E. of
regression

264.2210

Akaike info criterion

14.18458

Sum squared 977378.5
resid
Log likelihood -123.6612

Schwarz criterion

14.38244

F-statistic

12.15960

DurbinWatson stat

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000345

1.674789

4. CONCLUSIONS
This study reveals the essential characteristics of an economy that is dependent on the
collection of economic rent associated with the production of a single commodity, namely,
oil. The rentier in Iran’s case is the state itself (thus, rentier state), and oil is a single
commodity whose price has been forcefully determined by the globalized oil market since
the 1970s. The subject under study also has a counterpart in the economic development
literature, known as Dutch Disease, which pertains to the effect of the booming raw
material sector on deindustrialization of the economy as a whole. In this manner, both of
these approaches lead to similar conclusions that the undo domination of one particular
sector, if not countered by appropriate policy, would ultimately lead to “deindustrilization”
of the economy as a whole. The rentier characteristic is particularly relevant to many oilproducing states in the Middle East.
We have demonstrated that the Iranian economy has long been dominated by the oil sector,

and by the global oil market. The oil exports have a lion share of Iran’s international trade,
and the oil revenues constitute the main source of country’s foreign exchange earnings.
The entire period of 1960-1997 is divided into the two sub-periods of 1960-1979 and 19801997, corresponding with the Shah’s and the Islamic Republic regimes, respectively.
During the Shah’s regime, the trend of capital formation (a vital source of economic
growth) shows a positive and significant relationship with the volume of Iranian oil
revenues. However, following the oil-price hike of mid-1970s, which brought a
monumental windfall to the Shah’s treasury, the oil revenues have had a negative effect on
the capital formation in Iran. From the standpoint of economic development, therefore, this
is clearly evidence of outright waste (e.g., conspicuous consumption and monumental
military expenditure), and neglectful economic conduct on the part of Iranian government
under the Shah.
As for the oil policy and economic development under the Islamic government, the trend of
oil revenues shows no significant relationship with that of Iran’s national capital
formation. It is true that Iran’s oil export capacity has been reduced considerably under the
Islamic government. It is also true that the global oil prices have been on a declining trend,
thus resulting in declining oil revenues (and foreign exchange) for Iran during the last two
decades or so.
Yet, the question of Iran-Iraq war aside, it is important to note that the Islamic government
has completely neglected the task of capital formation, and instead pursued, perhaps
deliberately, a myopic policy of attending to (short-term) consumption expenditures (see
The Third Five-Year Development Plan, 1999-2004). Such an economic policy may have
been motivated by the threat of potential (domestic) social and political upheavals, thus
revealing the diehard tendency of extending state subsidies to certain social strata, interest
groups and institutions that have provided protection and ideological support to the present
regime in Iran.

END NOTES
1. This paper was presented at the Middle East Economic Association / Allied Social
Science Association Meeting, Jauary, 4-6, 2002, Atlanta, GA, USA
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